Housing Repair and Reconstruction After Loma Prieta
Mary C. Comerio

Associate Professor of Architecture
University of California, Berkeley

This paper describes the housing losses that occurred as a result of the Loma Prieta earthquake and the attempt to provide emergency, temporary, and housing recovery services. The first section briefly describes the losses in four key areas, San Francisco, Oakland, Santa Cruz, and Watsonville. The second section describes the differences between single family and multi-family housing needs as well as the services provided by relief agencies and the patchwork of one-time extra-agency housing relief solutions created after the disaster. The final section reviews the cost and effectiveness of the overall assistance provided in the aftermath of the Loma Prieta earthquake and discusses the lessons which can be learned to improve housing recovery in future disasters.

On October 17, 1989, at 5:04 PM, an earthquake measuring 7.1 on the Richter scale rocked the San Francisco Bay Area for 15 seconds. In that brief period, a portion of the Bay Bridge and a three-quarter-mile section of the Nimitz freeway collapsed, and a large number of buildings in Watsonville, Santa Cruz, the Marina, and downtown districts in San Francisco and Oakland sustained significant damage. Data from a variety of sources (DeMonte, 1990; Housing Needs, 1991; HUD, 1991) allow us to estimate that approximately 12,000 housing units were lost or severely damaged, and another 30-35,000 incurred some minor damage in the Loma Prieta earthquake. Of the 12,000 lost or severely damaged, approximately 7,000 (60%) were rental units and 4,500 (40%) were affordable units. See Tables 1 and 2.

TABLE 1: Damages to Housing Units

TABLE 2: Estimated Rental Units/Affordable Units Destroyed or Significantly Damaged

Media coverage of the event focused on the dramatic collapse of Marina district apartments, but this was not the whole story. There was extensive damage to older residential buildings throughout San Francisco. A total of 25,000 housing units incurred some damage, and of these 1450 were "red-tagged" or officially declared uninhabitable, and almost 5,000 units were in need of substantial repair. Only 25% of those units lost or substantially damaged were located in the Marina district. Of the remaining 75%, half were in downtown neighborhoods: South of Market, Tenderloin, Bush Street Corridor, and Chinatown; half were distributed around the city with concentrations in the Richmond and Sunset districts (SF Mayors City of San Francisco, 1989). The damaged buildings were, typically, three and four story wood frame with soft first stories, except in the downtown area. There the damaged buildings were older four to six story unreinforced masonry (URM) construction.

All of the 1,300 units destroyed or significantly damaged in Oakland were in ten unreinforced masonry downtown SRO hotels. Here again, these hotels served as the last affordable housing resource for many minority and elderly residents in an urban community of high property values, high rents, and few options for those at the bottom of the income ladder. The city estimates that the earthquake added 2,500 people to the roster of homeless in the city. By comparison, the 2,000 units which sustained moderately damage were primarily wood frame single-family houses with cracked chimneys, foundations, porches, and stairs. By and large, the inhabitants of the latter group did not need temporary or alternative housing. They were able to live with the damages and repair them over time (City of Oakland, 1993).

The greatest concentrated loss of commercial and residential buildings was in the Pacific Garden Mall area of the City of Santa Cruz, a seaside community and university town of 48,000. In addition to the loss ofapproximately 25 commercial structures, four residential hotels with approximately 400 units were lost. Three of these housed low-income elderly tenants and only one of the smaller hotels had a more transient population. Numerous single-family residences and small apartments were rendered unoccupiable and throughout the county, something on the order of 10,000 housing units incurred moderate damage (Santa Cruz County, 1989).

Watsonville sustained the greatest single-family housing loss. Some 850 housing units (10% of the city's housing stock) was severely damaged or destroyed. These were small wood frame houses and apartment buildings literally knocked off their foundations; 40% were owner occupied; more than 75% were affordable housing units. Largely occupied by farm worker and cannery worker extended families, these houses typically had one permanent owner/tenant as well as informal sub-tenants who may be relatives or friends, some legal, some illegal, some permanent, and some migrant workers. There were reports of 30-40 people living in one house, individuals and families living in converted garages and chicken coops. In fact, in inspecting the damage, city officials found as many as 300 "illegal" dwellings (Phillips, 1991, Comerio, 1992).

One year after the earthquake, the damaged wood frame single-family stock has largely been repaired or replaced, except in cases near the epicenter where geotechnical studies and land use issues have forced delays. Seven years later, the picture for masonry and wood-frame multi-family housing is quite different. About half of the units severely damaged or lost have been repaired or replaced. The reason is twofold. First, the existing programs designed to assist housing recovery are geared toward the single-family home-owner and as such there is very little funding available that can be used for multi-family buildings. Second, the assumption built in to the existing programs is that the private market will adjust and provide alternative housing resources in the post-disaster period. The concentrated losses of inner-city affordable housing resulting from the Loma Prieta earthquake proved this assumption false and forced a re-evaluation of existing housing recovery and reconstruction programs.

Emergency Sheltering

Although the State of California and the local chapters of the American Red Cross (ARC) consistently receive high praise for their planning and execution of emergency services in the first 24 to 48 hours after a disaster, the emergency response to the Loma Prieta earthquake left many victims with the perception that services were financially and racially biased. According to plan the ARC set up mass care shelters in schools and public buildings. Tents were also used in Watsonville and Santa Cruz. Although the procedures were routine, the levels of service and the attitudes of volunteers varied considerably. It was widely believed that volunteers gave "better" service to white middle-class owners and renters, and lacked sensitivity to low-income, ethnic, minority, and transient disaster victims. In part, the problem is institutional in that the rental assistance for temporary housing provided by both the ARC and FEMA requires "permanent" resident status; that is, documentation of ownership or lease agreements for a period of longer than 30 days. As such, mass-care shelter operators sometimes applied the criteria to those seeking shelter instead of following the "humanitarian care first, questions later" motto of senior ARC staff.

The insensitivity problem is also a function of the pool of volunteers (locally and nationally) who are predominantly white and middle-class and who have no training in working with people from culturally diverse backgrounds. In Watsonville, the ARC was unwilling to recognize the informal tent camps in town parks as official sheltersfor several days. There were few Spanish speaking volunteers and little tolerance for the victims' fear of returning to any structure, despite the documented problemsin the milder Whittier earthquake of 1985, when many Hispanic victims camped in their cars and on street curbs for almost a month before returning to their homes and apartments.

ARC and FEMA provide "temporary" shelter by providing up to 18 months of rental assistance for homeowners until they can package their loans, and/or insurance settlement, and rebuild their homes, and two months’ rental assistance for renters. Unfortunately, a disproportionate number of the victims were living in low-income rental accommodations without any security of tenure. For these victims, access to FEMA or Red Cross temporary rental assistance was blocked by their inability to produce a lease or other documentation of residency at the same time that the number of affordable units in their community has been seriously reduced. Although in some areas and in some cases, FEMA and the Red Cross accepted vouchers from clergy and other non-traditional proof of residency, the majority of people living in downtown San Francisco and Oakland hotels with 28 day rental limits, the elderly living in Santa Cruz hotels, the roommates, extended family members, and informal sub-tenants in Watsonville and Santa Cruz county houses did not qualify for any housing service other than emergency shelter. In retrospect, most agency personnel believe that the 30-day rule needs to be changed so that all victims could receive some temporary rental assistance for the obvious reason that it is better, safer, and healthier to accommodate victims in traditional housing units rather than to keep large numbers of unrelated individuals and families in mass-care shelters in public buildings.

Repair of Single-Family Houses

Individual homeowners with repairable damage found a variety of resources in federal and state housing recovery programs. The majority of the single-family housing reconstruction funding came through the SBA loan program. Other programs include:a $5,000 minimum home repair (MHR) grant from FEMA for limited repairs to primary dwellings, and Individual Family Grants (IFGP) combining FEMA and state funds (maximum $21,500) for real and personal property replacement. Mortgage assistance and Additional Living Expenses (ALE) were also available if needed through a FEMA program. Finally, if a homeowner’s needs were not met through these programs, they could apply for a loan from the California Disaster Assistance Program (CALDAP), administered by the state office of Housing and Community Development (HCD). The CALDAP program was initially set up on two tracks:CALDAP-O for owner occupiers, and CALDAP-R for rental housing owners, and initially funded with $23 million in each track for loans and grants. Four years after the event, CALDAP-O has provided $43 million in loans to homeowners, but there are still some loans applications pending.

All in all, the resources available for homeowners to repair or rebuild single-family residences seem entirely adequate for a moderate disaster the scale of Loma Prieta. The major criticism of this aspect of the housing recovery program is that it is a bureaucratic nightmare. Each loan program has its own application forms and approval procedures and each sends its own inspector to review and assess the damage. Further, an individual must be rejected from one program before they can apply for the next, saddling disaster victims with ridiculous time delays and mountains of paperwork.

ronically, in the town of Watsonville, where more than 800 single family homes were destroyed or significantly damaged, very few victims applied for or received federal and state assistance. Yet, one year after the earthquake, 75% of the houses were repaired or replaced How? The City received over $1 million dollars in donations from individuals, corporations, foundations, and its sister city in Japan. The Red Cross supplemented this fund with $2. 5 million for affordable housing assistance. Watsonville officials recognized that the majority of their population would not qualify for SBA loans and probably would not attempt the complex process of applying for FEMA and State assistance. The City quickly decided to use the donations for small grants of $20,000 to $40,000 to any residents in need of construction funds.

Further, numerous volunteer organizations and religious groups (e. g. .  the Mennonites, the Christian World Relief Committee, Habitat for Humanity, and others) donated time and funds in the rebuilding effort. Many weekends were marked by volunteer construction workers involved in "barn raising" new residences. The close knit Latino community also contributed to the self-help atmosphere. In addition, the wood frame small scale buildings made it easy for unskilled labor to assist in the construction efforts, and the City decided to be "easy on permits and tough on inspections," allowing people to get on with the work without delays.

Repair of Multi-Family Structures

A simplistic view of the rebuilding phase, as suggested by the name, assumes rebuilding the destroyed housing units as they were before, or replacing them with similar structures that will provide the same features, service, and value that the destroyed buildings provided. In fact that is not what happens, nor is it what is needed. Virtually all the agencies' housing assistance programs are designed for a prototypical, or ideal, victim, who owns or rents a housing unit which is adequate, conventional, and replaceable. Unfortunately, a significant portion of the individuals and families who lost housing in the Loma Prieta earthquake lived in old, poorly maintained, overcrowded, structurally unsound buildings because they could not afford better-quality accommodations.

The Loma Prieta earthquake exposed the lack of specific programs targeted for the repair and reconstruction of multi-family and affordable housing. The Small Business Administration is the only federal agency making loans to apartment owners and these are managed through the business (not the housing) loan program and loans will not be made if rents cannot cover the additional debt. The State created theCalifornia Disaster Assistance Program (CALDAP) to fill the gap of unmet housing needs. The program was based in the Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) and staffed by individuals from other affordable housing programs.

Unfortunately, the CALDAP rental program could not meet the needs of most private or non-profit entities attempting the reconstruction of affordable housing. Several factors contribute to the problems CALDAP encountered. The program was a new program with no set procedures or guidelines, and the rules changed each time the agency had to return to the legislature for additional funds. As a relief program, it was modeled after other relief programs which provide funds to assist in restoring residential units to pre-earthquake conditions. For run down old buildings, the requirement to return buildings to pre-earthquake conditions was unreasonable and illogical.

For example, a 160-unit residential hotel in San Francisco was demolished. After a long process involving foreclosure and purchase by the Redevelopment Agency, the site was made available to a non-profit housing agency. Zoning regulations limited the height to eight stories to protect a nearby park from shadow. Given the site size, the non-profit could only build 140 of the smallest possible units within the zoning envelope. This discrepancy, along with the limitation on quality upgrades, limited support for development costs, the rent requirements and tenant relocation requirements imposed by CALDAP, led to innumerable delays and an ultimate resolution that CALDAP funding would only be used for 40% of the total project.

Despite the fact that the CALDAP program became a source of frustration to all of the people trying to utilize it, it was the only source of financing for the replacement of low-income housing in all areas affected by the earthquake. Overall, the CALDAP rental program loaned $44 million and provided 142 rental property owners with a total of about 2,800 units with loans averaging $15,000 per unit.

One Time Solutions

The frustration experienced by local governments and affordable housing advocates over the lack of resources for low-income victims took form in a frontal attack on FEMA by San Francisco Mayor Art Agnos and enormous pressure on the Red Cross to redirect all contributions directly to the Bay Area instead of reserving some portion of the funds raised for future disasters. The critical media blitz captured national attention, and led to a number of special assistance programs that were unique to Loma Prieta. These special sources of funding for affordable housing renovation and reconstruction have become the primary mechanisms for aiding low-income victims, but unfortunately, each is perceived as a one-time solution by relief agencies.

The Legal Aid Society of Alameda County sued FEMA to contest FEMA's interpretation of the relief regulations requiring 30-day residency for financial assistance, which disqualified many SRO dwellers, the lack of due process in the appeal procedure, and the incomplete information provided by FEMA regarding the assistance to which the disaster victims were entitled. While the strictly legal recourse to the grievance would have been to ask FEMA to provide rental assistance to the people concerned, Legal Aid recognized that the temporary rental assistance wouldn't have solved the problem when no comparable units were available on the market. Therefore, Legal Aid decided to ask for money to replace the units lost in the earthquake.  After agreeing to that solution, FEMA appeared to renege on the settlement, and it took another year of legal and media battles to create a second settlement which provided $23 million to fund 2,200 SRO units. The settlement sum was arrived at by multiplying the number of SRO units lost by a unit cost of about $10,500. The money was divided among the various counties based on their proportional number of SRO units lost. The flexibility of the final settlement was ideal from the point of view of the local agencies, because the funds were provided in a block grant fashion to the counties and as such allowed them the freedom to decide how to put the money to best use, with very few restrictions. Overall, 1,200 to 1,500 units were actually rebuilt using lawsuit funds.

Alameda County received the largest share, $11. 8 million, of the settlement funds. Although $2 million was used for emergency sheltering costs, the remainder went to Oakland, where 1300 of the lost SRO housing units were located. The City pledged one million to a multi-service homeless shelter and used the remainder to rehabilitate damaged buildings. Due to FEMA restrictions, the funds could not be used to assist private owners. Thus, the city assisted in arranging the sale of these buildings to non-profits and committed City and Community Development Block Grant funds to complete the projects. The transactions slowed the recovery process so that one year later, only one hotel with 84 units was completed. Four years after the event, two additional hotels and the multi-service center were completed for a total of 300 units restored to service. Six other hotels with approximately 600 units are in varying stages of construction, still leaving a deficit of 400 units.

The American Red Cross responded to political pressure to use some of the $52 million generated in the highly successful fundraising drive after the Loma Prieta earthquake for housing recovery purposes. ARC set aside a special fund for various human service projects to earthquake victims, and about 13. 15 million dollars for housing recovery projects.  Of that, $900,000 were given as grants to low-income home owners, $10 million were set aside for various multi-family projects, as part of the financing needed to rebuild, and $2. 25 million were allocated as predevelopment loans to non-profits to enable them to start the development process (ARC, 1992).

Many of the non-profit agencies who purchased damaged buildings with the intent of renovating them with funds from CALDAP and/or the FEMA lawsuit settlement were quite skilled in financing affordable-housing rehabilitation. These organizations leveraged ARC, CALDAP, or FEMA settlement funds to obtain additional financing from Redevelopment Agencies, tax credits, other state (HCD) housing funds, and private lenders. Because the disaster recovery funding covered only 20% to 50% of the rebuilding costs, the funds provided by traditional low-income housing lenders were not available for their original function, to increase the affordable housing stock.

Further, the federal programs at HUD were not made available for disaster recovery. Despite a memorandum from the Region IX office to Secretary Kemp in Washington, dated February 1990, describing the crisis and recommending additional allocations of section 8 vouchers and rental rehabilitation program funds to the affected cities, HUD was unwilling to assume the responsibility of assisting in the rebuilding of housing for low-income populations. Its only action was the allocation of 500 rental assistance vouchers and 664 moderate rehabilitation vouchers to the area. This did not represent any extra allocation, but only an attempt to speed up existing allocations, which because of bureaucratic delays, did not materialize until the summer of 1990.

The Economics of Housing Recovery

The reason housing is not rebuilt after natural disasters is not solely a function of recovery program design or implementation, it is tied with the economics of the marketplace. Someone, usually the building owner or potential lender, compares the cost of rebuilding with the potential for recovering those costs in the marketplace, and decides the two just do not add up.

Different types of housing are valued according to different attributes. Single family homes are bought, sold, built –and following a disaster, rebuilt –on the basis of three attributes: the shelter provided (the space, the lot, the design features), the location (neighborhood, schools, proximity to work, etc. ), and the wealth potential (appreciation, tax shelter, cash flow). Because the long term value of an owner occupied house is linked to its condition, homeowners have a powerful incentive to maintain their properties and to rebuild them after a disaster. Even at moderate appreciation rates of two to four percent, Homeowners can absorb significant post-disaster rebuilding costs up to 20% of the initial home value and still make a reasonable profit. (Comerio, et al., 1994)

By contrast, renters rent housing for two reasons –shelter and location– but not for reasons of profit enhancement. Investors in rental housing (including developers, landlords, and partners) have a different set of concerns. Investors care about shelter and location only as much as they impact a particular properties profit potential. Unlike homeowners, investors have an incentive to maintain theirproperties only to the extent that the maintenance directly enhances cash flows. Following this logic, post disaster rebuilding expenses are unlikely to be undertaken if they cannot be quickly recovered out of rents.

Put simply, the likelihood of a single family home owner rebuilding a damaged or destroyed unit depends jointly on personal and financial concerns. The likelihood of a multi-family investor rebuilding a damaged building depends primarily on their ability to raise rents without losing tenants. Except in very tight housing markets, landlords have little ability to unilaterally raise rents, because if they do, the tenants will move elsewhere. Thus, when a building owner is faced with additional debt to cover damages for 20% of the initial building value, the owner would have to raise rents eight to ten percent in order to maintain pre-disaster levels of operating capital. The implication is clear:there is little if any economic incentive to rebuild multi-family housing, even with relatively favorable financing terms. The greater the repair cost, the more highly the owner is leveraged, the higher the market vacancy rate, or the poorer the tenant base, the greater the incentives for property abandonment. This basic economic reality was clearly demonstrated after Loma Prieta. Of the 12,000 units lost, 9,000 were in multi-family buildings. Of these, nearly 90% were still out of service one year after the earthquake, and four years later, about 50% of these remain unrepaired or unreplaced (Comerio, et.  al. , 1994).

Lessons

Major disasters change the physical and social fabric of cities in unalterable ways. Agencies as well as individuals use the disaster as an opportunity to change the status quo, to their advantage. An individual rebuilding his house may want to make some changes that he was contemplating even before the disaster struck; a city may use funds available from earthquake reconstruction, to finance homeless shelters and multiservice centers (as was the case in Oakland and San Francisco). A region may seize the opportunity of major destruction in the roads and infrastructure to transform and renew the infrastructure of the area. It is within that context that the design of assistance programs has to take place. The stress in the rebuilding phase is the rebuilding of the individual and community lives, and not on the rebuilding of the particular artifacts that sustain it.

The Loma Prieta earthquake deepened an already existing housing crisis in the Bay Area. Many home owners and multi-family building owners were probably carrying as much debt as the property could carry, and could not afford to take further loans to rebuild or rehabilitate the property. It was apparent that the normal single-family housing-oriented recovery programs would not be sufficient to enable real housing recovery. Furthermore, because the earthquake hit hardest in areas of concentrated multi-family low-income housing, the market was not able to provide alternative or replacement housing at affordable rents, without some assistance from the public. Overall, only 40% of the housing losses were served through the normal disaster assistance process, and 60% can be described as a residue of unmet needs. Of these, half found some assistance through the one-time solutions, but these are not models for future disaster relief and recovery programs.

Table 3: Summary of Expenditures on Building Repair by Client Groups

Table 3 summarizes the expenditures made by various public agencies towards housing assistance and recovery in the Bay Area after the Loma Prieta earthquake. The relation between spending on owners and renters, including insurance, shows that out of an estimated $1,130,000 spent on earthquake recovery 66% ($750 million) was spent on assistance for owner occupiers, although only 40% of the stock of damaged units was in single-family dwellings. Eliminating funds paid by insurance, and looking only at the public assistance money, we see that home owners still received proportionally more funding than renters, 62% of the funds as opposed to 40% of the damaged units. Furthermore, the aid that is given to rental housing is not direct aid that goes to the renter, but aid given to owners of rental housing. Some of it goes into pre-development expenses and organizational overhead, not only into construction and repair. Therefore, the net sums used to restore the rental units is probably at least another 20% less.

In summary, it seems that state and federal governments should step in to aid local and county governments and individuals in the housing recovery process. Existing programs are biased towards homeowners. A more equitable approach would be to insure that the funds are distributed evenly across housing types. A pro-active approach would insist that the earthquake presents an opportunity to redress some of the housing inequities, and direct more funds on the basis of need, and not on the basis of the losses incurred during the earthquake. The housing recovery experience after Loma Prieta leads to three lessons to improve post disaster housing recovery:

1. Post earthquake housing recovery requires pre-earthquake planning. Although California is rightfully proud of its planning and readiness for emergency response in the event of a disaster, Loma Prieta has taught a valuable lesson in exposing the gaps in housing recovery and provides a road map for thinking about recovery planning. There is a need to promote hazards mitigation in all structures but particularly in vulnerable multi-family structures. Mitigation is the single most cost effective method of reducing damage and limiting the human and financial costs after disasters. There is a need to create recovery funding programs for multi-family affordable housing. This requires rethinking the current federal and state programs and their relation to ongoing housing strategies, and it requires standardized reporting of damage and realistic budgeting.

The entire structure of disaster housing recovery needs to be rethought in terms of the method for estimating housing losses and recovery needs, and in terms of the delivery system for assistance. A careful damage assessment based on common methods of data collection for each locale could be used to prepare a federal housing recovery budget for the state, which could in turn develop its own assistance budget. These funds could be distributed through an agreed-upon delivery system which is already providing affordable housing assistance. The concept is one of state and federal block grants, administered through existing agencies so that state and local governments know how much they have to work with and they are familiar with the rules and regulations of the administering agencies.

2. Existing recovery programs should be streamlined to expedite services. The single most important thing government and relief agencies can do for disaster victims is expedite the process of getting back to normal. The DACs are established to provide information and assistance in the recovery process to disaster victims, and each individual or family is assigned a case number when they come in. FEMA has created a single intake form which allows them the ability to computerize information on the victims which is shared through an electronic network with all the recovery funding agencies. There could be one similar application form for housing recovery assistance which could be devised to cover all the information needed by each of the possible funding agencies. One agency could take the lead in assessing the actual damage through a single inspection by a qualified knowledgeable contractor, and then have a loan officer analyze which combination of loans, grants, and temporary assistance should be provided.

3. Housing recovery programs will be most effective if they are administered at the local level. Housing recovery involves the development and redevelopment of land and buildings, a process which requires localized construction expertise, the involvement of local private lenders, local government approvals as well as owners and tenants. This is not a process which can be managed by state and federal agencies alone.

A well-planned process for distribution of housing recovery funds could avoid the mistakes and delays that occurred after Loma Prieta. The excursions taken by FEMA, and particularly ARC, into housing finance because of the political pressure to provide affordable housing assistance were taxing both for the organizations and for the clients. The agencies were afraid to make mistakes because of their lack of expertise in the field of housing, and as a result, officials tended to stricter interpretations of regulations than what might have been necessary. Further, their tendency to distrust the local housing official created an atmosphere in which unusual and/or creative local solutions were perceived as fraudulent. The piecemeal housing aid and the process through which is was achieved is not a model for future disasters. The best and most expedient method for affordable housing recovery is to allow local governments the ability to make decisions on how to best serve the affected populations in their community and to provide funding through existing channels.

Acknowledgments

The data for this paper was developed in a research project for the California Governor's Office of Emergency Services, conducted by the author with John Landis and Yodan Rofe. The final report, Post-Disaster Residential Rebuilding, is published as Working Paper #608 by the Institute of Urban and Regional Development (IURD), University of California at Berkeley, February 1993, and may be published as a policy paper by OES at a future date.

References

ARC, 1992, "Special Disaster Relief Fund," Quarterly Report on Project Status, December 31.

California Natural Disasters Assistance Rental Program (CALDAP-R), 1992, "Activity Summary"and "Production Report," Department of Housing and Community Development, June 30.

City of Oakland, 1993, "Loma Prieta Damaged Properties List," Office of Planning and Building, Mar. 18.

City of San Francisco, 1989, "Earthquake Impact on Low and Moderate Income Housing," Report # 4, Mayor's Office of Housing, November 20.

Comerio, Mary, 1992, "Hazards Mitigation and Housing Recovery," Disasters and the Small Dwelling, London:James and James.

Comerio, Mary, John Landis and Yodan Rofe, 1994, Post Disaster Residential Rebuilding, Institute of Urban and Regional Development, University of California, Berkeley.

De Monte, Robert, 1990, "Memorandum on Proposed Earthquake Response by Region IX," HUD, Feb.

Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 1991, "Status of Recovery from the Earthquake in San Francisco, Oakland, Santa Cruz and Surrounding Areas," HUD Region IX Report, September.

"Housing Needs in Earthquake Disaster Areas," 1990, Field Hearings before the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development, House of Representatives, Washington D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, Serial # 101-115.

"Loma Prieta earthquake Reconnaissance Report," 1990, Earthquake Spectra, Supplement to Vol. 6, May.

Phillips, Brenda D. , 1991, "Post Disaster Shelter and Housing of Hispanics, the Elderly, and the Homeless," NSF Report, Southern Methodist University, August.

Santa Cruz County, 1989, "Summary Damage Report,"County Information Services, December 8.

Updated December 9, 1997.
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